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Abstract—Today P2P faces two important challenges: design
of mechanisms to encourage users’ collaboration in multimedia
live streaming services; design of reliable algorithms with QoS
provision, to encourage the multimedia providers employ the
P2P topology in commercial live streaming systems. We believe
that these two challenges are tightly-related and there is much
to be done with respect. This paper analyzes the effect of user
behavior in a multi-tree P2P overlay and describes a business
model based on monetary discount as incentive in a P2P-Cloud
multimedia streaming system. We believe a discount model can
boost up users’ cooperation and loyalty and enhance the overall
system integrity and performance. Moreover the model bounds
the constraints for a provider’s revenue and cost if the P2P
system is leveraged on a cloud infrastructure. Our case study
shows that a streaming system provider can establish or adapt
his business model by applying the described bounds to achieve
a good discount-revenue trade-off and promote the system to the
users.
Index Terms—incentive, P2P, cloud, streaming, discount, mul-
timedia, business
I. INTRODUCTION
P2P brought an alternative to the client-server content dis-
tribution. It introduced an application level routing among the
users–called overlay–based on dynamically formed connec-
tions. Users may join and leave the overlay without restriction.
The important momentum of P2P was recognized in sys-
tems with heavy server load, caused by users’ overwhelming
demand operations. A typical example is bottlenecks caused
by traffic output demand in streaming systems. This kind of
server independent cost-efficient overlay, engaged numerous
users to a cooperative way of contents share and retrieval.
Despite the increasing support and innovations in P2P
systems, bypassing the server role impacts the traffic control
and security. Yet mechanisms to encourage users collaboration
and avoid malicious behavior, are an ongoing challenge for
multimedia live streaming systems. Moreover, the P2P algo-
rithms should guarantee continuous quality of service (QoS)
upon a system scale.
We organize this paper in two parts. First we briefly
introduce P2P and show the tight relation of the multi-tree
overlay topology with the user behavior in the system. Today
it is challenging to establish an incentive mechanism for a
commercial live streaming system. We follow up some of
the existing studies that address uncooperative and malicious
behavior in P2P streaming systems.
In the second part we describe a P2P-Cloud system for mul-
timedia streaming with a business model based on monetary
discount. So far the increasing offer of the cloud providers
facilitates a specific type of infrastructure that liberates a
client’s service from irrelevant features–pay for what you use.
The dedicated underlying infrastructure spread across conti-
nents to improve the system’s QoS and the users’ experience.
We believe cloud is a good asset with favorable price offers
and flexible infrastructure to leverage commercial P2P-assisted
multimedia streaming services.
As of the above reasons, the described system relies on
cloud infrastructure to host the multimedia service and set
up on P2P to redistribute the video among the users. We
establish the constraints for the provider’s revenue that bound
the feasibility of the business model. Furthermore we present
an analytical bounds for the provider’s infrastructure cost in
the established P2P-Cloud scenario.
Finally by analytical case study we found out the discount to
be a potentially beneficial incentive strategy for both provider
and participants in the multimedia streaming system, provided
it complies to the established constraints.
II. P2P LIVE STREAMING
In this section we describe the concept of P2P and its use
for multimedia streaming applications. Latter we focus on a
multi-tree P2P topology and describe the relation between the
user behavior and the overlay.
A. P2P overview
P2P represents a cooperative model of interconnected users
called peers. The integrity of P2P relies on the overlay
network formed among the users and depends on the aggregate
bandwidth in the system. When it appeared, the initial goal
of P2P was to support scenarios with voluntary participation,
where the users share their resources (ex. upload bandwidth,
computing capacity) among each other. P2P inspired research
in algorithms for overlay construction that aim on fair band-
width distribution across the users in the overlay.
This P2P idea found an immediate application in: file
sharing systems, cooperative on-line games and multimedia
streaming–live and on-demand with the appearance of Inter-
net TV and content delivery networks (CDN). BitTorrent1,





2applications that gained popularity among the file sharing and
streaming applications. Unlike the client-server model where
the contents are fetched from the server once per every client,
in P2P a content can be redistributed repeatedly among the
users. This is a fundamental difference that helps P2P enhance
the system performance and avoid server bottleneck.
Although widely accepted and increasingly used, P2P faces
an important drawback–the inability to prevent abusive and
uncooperative users to join the overlay. Several P2P applica-
tions still fail to detect such behavior. Furthermore, as highly
dynamic process, P2P streaming suffers of instability due to
peer churn, since the users can join and leave the network
voluntarily. This limits the exploitation of P2P for commercial
multimedia streaming applications on the Internet. Livestation5
with its premium subscription, BBC’s iPlayer1.06 (being P2P-
based until 2008), BitTorrent Live 7, Octoshape8 and Zattoo9
are few examples of commercial P2P-assisted live streaming
services.
Rodriguez et al. [1] observe the issues regarding commer-
cialization of P2P algorithms. They point out the necessity to
explore incentive models based on economic savings, access
to premium content or community-based alternatives.
It is challenging to establish an accurate business model
in a P2P-based system. The system continuously change as
new peers arrive and depart. Moreover uncooperative and
malicious users impact severely the overall integrity of the
system. Therefore - incentive mechanisms are necessary to
motivate such users to actively participate in the system.
B. P2P streaming topologies
In the literature, the P2P overlay topology is classified in
two general categories: multi-tree (tree as its subcategory) and
data-driven randomized (also called mesh).
1) Mesh: This approach organizes the users in a randomly
formed mesh, where the video is sliced in chunks and sent to
the users. Since the system we use in the paper bases on a
multi-tree topology to describe the business model, we omit
from details about mesh topology. For through description, Liu
et. al, [2] present a comparative analysis of the two overlays
employed in a streaming scenario.
2) Multi-tree: For the system described in the paper, we
base on a multi-tree overlay [3] to show the topology setup
effect on the QoS of the streaming system. We choose multi-
tree over mesh mostly because of the possibility to intervene
in the topology creation, unlike the mesh, which is randomly
created. Moreover the business model we explain latter, bases
on three levels of QoS and therefore we found convenient to
express the quality levels through multiples of sub-streams.
In a multi-tree overlay, the users take part in multiple d-
ary sub-trees. The streaming server is the root of the tree. He
divides the video with streaming rate r in m sub-streams and






formed in a breath-first manner, upon client’s arrival. Figure 1
depicts a typical multi-tree overlay with a server as a root of
the streaming content and two separate sub-trees. The tree has
a depth h = 3 and degree d = 2.
The tree degree defines node’s maximum number of chil-
dren, while the tree depth is the maximum number of traverses
from the root to the furtherest leaf. Since the tree is formed
in a breath first manner, higher tree degree results in wider
sub-trees and connects more users at higher tree levels (close
to the root). Bigger depth, in contrast, increases the number
of steps a streaming content traverse on his way to the leafs,
hence increases the delay at lower levels.
Therefore by adjusting the multi-tree topology, the provider
can either reduce the bandwidth demand by reducing the
tree degree as long as the delay is sustainable, or scale the
infrastructure to increase the bandwidth supply and decrease
the total delay. The previous analysis states for a valid
fi ≥ ri pre-condition, i.e. the peer should contribute at least
as much forward bandwidth fi as he amount he receives ri.
The contrary will provoke elapsed brunches in the multi-tree
environment. Therefore the streaming content provider should
account in advance the amount of peers’ bandwidth to share
in order to build an optimal overlay topology.
Fig. 1: SplitStream[3] overlay topology
C. Behavior in a P2P streaming system
We focus on the influence of both cooperative and un-
cooperative users in the system based on their position in
the streaming trees. To remind, P2P relies on collaborative
network of users that are expected to contribute, which in
practice, is not always the case. Cooperative users share
determined upload bandwidth with other users in the system,
unlike the uncooperative also called free riders, who enjoy the
streaming but don’t forward the video to the other users in the
tree. Malicious peers join the system exclusively to harm its
integrity and the QoS.
Cooperative users. In a multi-tree overlay these users
improve overlay construction and contribute to more balanced
sub-trees. Moreover they foster system’s performance increas-
ing shared bandwidth reserves. According to the multi-tree
3constraints in SplitStream[3], to achieve a feasible overlay a
client contributes upload bandwidth at least as the amount he
downloads. For a well-balanced overlay, authors suggest to
connect each user as inner node in only one sub-tree, and as
leaf in the rest, Figure 1. Sweha et al. on the other hand [4],
suggest connecting the users in minimum number of sub-trees.
From those, they appear as inner nodes only in a number of
sub-trees corresponding to their upload bandwidth.
Imagine cooperative users with high upload bandwidth.
Following the above recommendation, a provider can put them
on a higher level in a number of sub-trees equivalent to the
amount of their upload bandwidth. This opens proportional
number of connections for additional high level users. As a
conclusion, in a multi-tree P2P scenario, cooperative users
make significant contribution if placed higher in the sub-trees.
In a mesh overlay, due to its dynamic nature, a cooperative
users increase the availability of the streaming content to the
peers across the entire overlay. They also improve the overlay
integrity by forming a more stable connections among the
peers.
Uncooperative users. In a voluntary system as P2P is, the
presence of uncooperative users is inevitable as a result of the
optional bandwidth share and a peer’s will to increase for free
their personal welfare.
For a multi-tree overlay, this generates elapsed branches in
the sub-trees where the user appears as inner node, leaving
his successors as orphans. Higher level free riders make big
impact to the overlay integrity as they leave empty connections
and hence provoke sub-trees mis-balance. Uncooperative users
should be always connected at a lower tree level to reduce the
impact on the tree expansion and to avoid system’s resource
consumption.
Hosting selfish users in mesh overlay impacts to the same
extent, since the peers would lack the resources of the selfish
peer and thus experience a lower video quality. The selfish
node on the other hand take the advantage of the available
bandwidth of the peers he is connected to.
Malicious users. Unlike self interested users, malicious
ones are even worse candidates who threaten the system
integrity. They exploit the system by harming other peers
and prevent them to enjoy the streaming. They do this by
performing various actions such as: presenting false identities,
data drop and data pollution, collusion attacks with other peers,
assigning false reputations, etc. It is yet a challenging task
to detect and deal these users even for a widely used P2P
streaming systems.
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN P2P STREAMING
For best user experience, P2P live streaming requires
enough shared bandwidth and topology integrity. Therefore the
presence of incentive mechanisms is crucial to deal with neg-
ative behavior and generate more productive and user-friendly
environment. The literature offers plenty of information on
incentives for sharing in P2P. In essence, the aim is to motivate
users to participate actively in the distribution of data streams
by using their spare upload bandwidth. The authors in [5],
divide incentive mechanisms applied to P2P media streaming
into four groups: reciprocal, reputation-based, game-theoretic
and taxation-based.
Reciprocal mechanisms base on the tit-for-tat strategy and
it is mostly used in file sharing systems. Peers only exchange
resources with neighbors with similar upload rates. Occasion-
ally, they allocate their own upload capacity by assigning
slots - first to those users with more transfer rate. In this
scheme, free riders are alienated as they don’t reach friendly
relationships with their neighbors.
In [6] there is an interesting instance where a tit-for-tat
mechanism is combined with multiple layered video encod-
ing. Layered videos provide better quality when more layers
are received, thus, by using a tit-for-tat strategy, users who
transmit more layers receive more back and get a better video
quality as a result. Ngan [7] proposes a mechanism similar
to tit-for-tat aimed for P2P streaming services. He suggests
temporal reconstruction of the overlay to distinguish nodes
with selfish behavior and avoid free riders. This however
increases overhead any time the tree is reconstructed.
Limitation. Peers can only contribute to other peers with
similar contribution levels.
Game-Theory. Bases on game theory approach to imple-
ment strategic play among the participants in the streaming
system. Every peer (strategic player) tries to optimize his play,
that is, maximize the amount of data received while minimiz-
ing the amount of data transmitted. Lin et. al [8] provides
a game-theoretic framework to model player’s behavior and
design incentive strategies for P2P live streaming.
Limitation. This approach faces a difficulty to deal with
peer churn because of the precondition that every peer should
stay until the end of the game, i.e. the multimedia streaming
session.
Taxation. All the previous mechanisms tend to reward
users based solely on their contribution. However, those peers
with less capabilities in terms of bandwidth can be, in some
cases, punished for the lack of resources rather than for the
lack of willingness to participate. Chu [9] motivates users
to contribute with the entire available bandwidth, i.e., users
with high upload bandwidth get encouraged to participate
with more bandwidth than they need to receive the whole
stream, in order to compensate for the ”less fortunates”. This
altruistic approach aims to achieve a sort of social-welfare in
the system where, ideally, more users are allowed to receive
media in good conditions. Yang et. al in [10] incorporate
taxation based incentive mechanism into QoS aware neighbor
selection algorithm.
Limitation. Free rides can however profit in systems with
this mechanism unless dealt properly, since the altruistic nature
of taxation has no means to deal with them.
Reputation-based mechanisms deal with providing a
global rating for every user in the system. This score improves
with the user’s contribution. Users consult the reputation of the
possible receivers and choose content suppliers. A reputation is
an indirect-reciprocity mechanism. This means, as opposed to
the reciprocal systems based on mutual relation of two peers,
reputation is global. The main drawback of reputation for
media streaming is that it can take time to build up. However,
[11] uses a reputation history to improve on his reciprocal
4system, allowing users to perform informed choices when they
select future candidates. This history bases on the previous
interactions among the users.
In his study, Li [12], claims that reputation and credit-
based incentive mechanisms although successful in a file-
sharing P2P applications, are unlikely to work in a streaming
scenarios due to limited time framework. As an open issue,
he encourages further investigation for incentive models and
price establishment in P2P streaming.
Limitation. Peers with poor BW are likely to have lower
reputation scores and thus lower priority in selecting which
peer to obtain the stream of; a lack of reputation history for
new coming peers; high reputation peer can loose stimulation
to contribute further in the system; free-riders can abuse the
grace period given to newcomers to take advantage of the
system.
Apart from the described incentives, the literature offers
models based on combinations of some of the above tech-
niques. One example is the approach to introduce the social
network data into game-theory approach as incentive in file-
sharing [13].
An example of a commercial service on the Internet is to
classify the clients in premium and basic membership based
on subscriptions. Premium users usually pay monthly/yearly
price and enjoy certain privileges such as - commercial-free,
complete access to all services. Basic users on the other hand,
are charged per content or have restricted access of contents
and receive commercials during the streaming.
We registered no commercial streaming systems however,
that uses QoS of video in their business models. In the next
section we present a case study for a business model based on
QoS which applies a discount-based incentive.
IV. DISCOUNT INCENTIVE APPLIED TO P2P-CLOUD
STREAMING SYSTEM
The trend of using cloud infrastructure to leverage multi-
media services has increased in the last years. In a recent
study [14] we showed that using cloud-based P2P streaming,
increases overall system performance and improves QoS for
the participants in the multimedia streaming service.
Deploying a P2P streaming service in a centrally controlled
system opens as many possibilities for the streaming content
providers as for the users. The easy-to-use and on-demand
cloud infrastructure saves for provider the cost of underutilized
on-premise resources. This traces the way for innovative and
user-oriented granular price classification to define a good
business model for streaming service in the cloud.
A. Business model description
In this section we base on our previously proposed multime-
dia streaming system [15] to illustrate what are the provider’s
cost constraints to establish a commercial P2P service. We
also describe discount incentive model based on money and
discuss its application on the system. This system relays on
cloud infrastructure for better QoS and service-scale in case
of overload.
Figure 2 depicts the system topology. There is the server
of the streaming content in the cloud and a P2P multi-tree
topology formed among the clients. Before sending to the
clients, the video is divided in sub-streams (three in this case)
and disseminated in three different sub-trees. The streaming
content provider can contract cloud instances in different
geographic zones and connect each client in his closest sub-
tree. This decreases video delay and facilitates scalability,
since once a sub-tree is saturated (no left forward BW for
upcoming clients), the system can be scaled on-time in the
closest geographic zone.
Fig. 2: P2P-Cloud architecture with multi-tree overlay
The business model of the system consists of three types
of subscriptions–gold, silver and bronze defined according to
the QoS a client signs up for. Since we discussed previously
that the video is divided into various sub-streams, gold clients
receive all sub-streams which result in maximum perceived
video quality with almost no delay; silver clients consequently
receive less streams and experience some delay; and bronze–
few streams with more delay. Gold clients get connected to all
sub-trees at higher levels, while silver and bronze go to lower
levels. Clients can choose a subscription type and connect to
the service at the scheduled streaming time, provided they
have enough download bandwidth to receive the requested
sub-streams. Each client declares if he will participate in
the P2P network and the amount of upload bandwidth to
offer to other clients. After the end of the streaming, peers
are rewarded with discount from the initially payed price–
an amount proportional to the shared bandwidth. The system
encourages gratis clients to connect provided they contribute
with their upload bandwidth. In exchange, they can watch the
video for free.
The system uses the multi-tree overlay topology to organize
peers in the number of trees according to the quality they want
and the price they pay. Heterogeneous peers can be connected
at appropriate tree level according to the amount of bandwidth
they declare to forward. Invested money will stimulate peers
to stay until the end of the streaming session. We believe the
commercial model itself decreases the number of malicious
users who would pay only to harm, but in case they exist,
5the provider can penalize them by connecting at leaf positions
or simply by expelling them from the system. The children
nodes from the elapsed brunches are then reconnected to other
trees before they suffer a lower short term quality (but not
interruption). The same way free-riders who forward less BW
then declared, can be penalized by reconnecting them at a
lower tree level and cutting off the discount they receive.
The key driver in this system is the monetary incentive
model. That stimulates cooperative behavior and motivates
clients to offer spare upload capacity as bandwidth as a
service. Next, we analyze the discount model and establish
a provider’s infrastructure cost. Later we apply the profit and
cost analysis to the system discussed in this part.
B. Discount-based peer incentive
In a P2P system where users pay a subscription price, the
idea behind a discount-based incentive lies in establishing
a remuneration policy to motive increased participation and
collaboration among the users. The discount applies over the
initial price proportionally to the amount of the shared band-
width. For feasibility of the model, we set up a precondition
for the provider–a positive revenue.
Provider’s revenue P (R) is money the provider receives
form the users for watching a streaming content such as:
football match, live-concert, a keynote presentation, a press-
conference etc. The revenue is tightly-coupled to the estab-
lished business model in the streaming service. It depends on
the total number of users Ni and the price associated to stream
the video Pi. Tv denotes the video duration.
Provider’s discount P (D) is a monetary remuneration Di
the provider offers to the users for sharing their bandwidth.
We denote a user’s total forward bandwidth as f and Tf the
time to forward the video to other users. Here Tf ≤ Tr to
denote peer’s sudden departure or fail.
Supposing all users will share their bandwidth, we can
establish the general constraints for a discount-based model:
P (R)− P (D) =
∑
i
Ni(Pi Tv −Di f Tf ) ≥ 0 (1)
It may be challenging for the provider to establish price-
discount (Pi/Di) trade-off, such that the above condition
states. This discount incentive reward the users for being
cooperative and partially returns them the invested money.
From our point of view, a remunerative price model is a
promising solution for commercial P2P based streaming.
The equation 1 although defined for a general discount
based model, can be adapted to reflect the business model
of this system, by defining more variables per price packet,
instead of having a unique price per video content. For
example, Ni = Pg + Ps + Pb, where Pg, Ps and Pb is the
subscription price for gold, silver and bronze packet. With
appropriate adaptation it can be applied to any discount based
model.
C. Provider’s cost and revenue
The multimedia contents on the Internet can be either
previously stored and streamed to the clients at a certain
time (VoD, IPTV), or shown as being emitted - live event
streaming. In a cloud scenario, the video can be encoded in
a streaming media server on premise or on the same cloud
instance. The provider decide to use the cloud, he may add
up charges for extended hosting services and tools such as:
load-balancers, optimized utilization of instances use across
data centers (in case of Amazon10), monitoring, etc. These
additional services are nonessential for our profit-cost trade-
off analysis, so will be omitted in the provider cost calculus. To
achieve a general price definition for a live streaming service
on the cloud, we abstract from the video source location and
define cost constraints per streaming event. From here, the total
provider’s cost depends on the cost per cloud instance and the
data transfer cost to forward the video from the publisher to
the directly connected users.
Instance cost C(I). Live streaming, unlike video on-
demand, has a time frame limit. To take advantage of the flexi-
ble cloud service, a provider may rent an on-demand instance.
Cloud providers today charge for the compute instances based
on the user/service requirements. For example Amazon EC2
classify on-demand instances on: standard - small, medium,
large, extra large; micro; high-memory; high-CPU; cluster-
compute; cluster-GPU and high-I/O.
Transfer cost C(T ) is a price for the output traffic from the
instance to the clients. What shapes this cost, is the streaming
video capacity together with the number of clients connected
directly to the instance.
Following is the TV provider’s cost to stream a video during
Tv, on a cloud instance with upload bandwidth capacity u(I)
that costs Ci, while the data transfer cost is Ct, across n
instances:
Pc = C(I) + C(T ) = (Ci + Ct u(I)) Tv n (2)
The cost depends on the number of cloud’s direct connections.
In a scenario where all clients are connected to the provider in
a star topology, the provider’s transfer cost increases linearly
with the number of clients. P2P topology instead, decreases the
number of direct connections by organizing peers in overlay
network. In such case less clients are connected directly to the
cloud, which reduces provider’s transfer cost.
Finally we conclude that adjusting cost and revenue to abide
to the condition P (R)−P (D)−Pc > 0, (eq: 1, 2), represents
a model for a discount based incentive for the participating
peers in the streaming system and essential constraint for a
provider of multimedia streaming service.
To calculate price-discount variables for the discussed busi-
ness model, we developed a tool TVProviderCostCalculator11,
based on the provider’s cost and revenue equations. Although
ti follows the model of the use case streaming system, it is
general enough to address similar economic-oriented business
models.
Case Study. Due to space limitation, we sketch briefly the
results obtained for an example case study. We chose three
different groups combinations for number of gold, silver and
10http://aws.amazon.com
11http://web.dit.upm.es/irenatr/calculator
6Fig. 3: Three compositions of gold, silver and bronze users and
respective discount % for different levels of user cooperation
bronze users and set up a price per streaming content (4, 2 and
1 euros consequently). We set up a discount of 0.5 euro per
GB shared. As medium forward upload bandwidth we choose
0.4 GB/h. We want to see how the % of users’ cooperation
in the system affect the provider’s revenue. Figure 3 shows
the % (y axis) of the total discount to three groups of users
(x axis), for four levels of user cooperation: all cooperative,
then 80%, 50%, 20% - cooperative. We note that even in the
perfect case when all peers participate, the total discount the
provider pays back does not reach 20% of his total revenue.
Moreover we consider a remuneration of 12.5%, 25%, 50%
off the initial price to be a decent monetary incentive for
the peers to contribute to the system. We should note that
this example is only to illustrate the outcome of the business
model when intuitive values for bandwidth and prices are
considered for the evaluation. It confirms the feasibility of
discount based approach in a multimedia system under the
given bounds. Finally it should serve as a basic discount model
which can vary and adapt depending on the particular system
and scenario.
V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we initially observed the characteristics of
P2P and the challenges it faces for increased adoption in
commercial live streaming systems. We sketched the influence
of the uncooperative and malicious users to the overall system
topology. The P2P dynamic nature increases system vulnera-
bility in the presence of uncooperative users, as they impact
the system integrity and the users’ perceived QoS.
In continuation we presented a business model with incen-
tive based on monetary discount. The model establishes the
constraints for users’ satisfaction and provider’s revenue in a
cloud-hosted P2P streaming service. We find that the discount
as a potential incentive in P2P-based streaming systems can
contribute to: increased shared bandwidth and better system’s
performance and user’s QoE. Moreover, implemented as a
multi-tree overlay with central authority it increases peer’s
trust and deals better malicious behavior and peer’s churn.
Finally we made an analysis for different groups of peer’s
compositions for four cooperation levels–from all cooperative
users to only 20% who share bandwidth and concluded that
an appropriately chosen discount and price values can boost
up users participation with low effect on the global provider’s
revenue.
To sum up, economic-oriented live streaming today faces
a slow tendency in adopting P2P for large-scale systems. Up
to our knowledge we are the first to present an example for
a business model based on QoS which applies a monetary
discount incentive.
As a future work, we plan to extend the analytical model
and study a real live event traces to quantify the benefit of this
business model for multimedia providers and users. Moreover
we plan to implement the P2P-Cloud system and gather real
data to qualify the system’s efficiency and measure the user’s
QoE.
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